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When Bad Becomes Good (and
Vice Versa): Why Social Exclusion
Is Not Based on Difference
DOMINIC ABRAMS, GEORGINA RANDSLEY DE
MOURA, PAUL HUTCHISON, and TENDAYI VIKI
The chapter describes our work on the Subjective Group Dynamics model. The model
proposes that whether deviant group members attract positive or negative reactions
depends on the implications of their actions or attitudes for the validity of ingroup
norms. As differences between ingroups and outgroups become more important,
members also become more likely to endorse or reject specific individuals from either
group that uphold ingroup norms. Therefore, some “pro-norm” ingroup deviants are
likely to be tolerated, whereas other “anti-norm” ingroup deviants are likely to be
rejected. The direction, rather than magnitude of deviance drives decisions to exclude or
include them. We describe evidence that reactions to deviants serve to sustain social
identity of group members and to sustain positive ingroup stereotypes. Developmental
evidence suggests that these reactions are a relatively sophisticated form of ingroup bias,
which may allow people to include and exclude others apparently as individuals, when
in fact the reactions are group-serving.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
T he capacity of groups for intolerance is well known (Hewstone, Rubin,& Willis, 2002). Traitors are rarely tolerated for long, and vengeance isoften brutal. For example, members of criminal organizations such as
the mafia have been known to torture and kill ingroup members that violate
accepted codes of conduct. Historically, western societies have also been known
to marginalize and exclude certain people from partaking in the benefits of
being members of the society. Homosexual or homeless people have historically
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been marginalized or socially excluded on the basis of their “deviant” social
status. However, this capacity for groups to dehumanize and demonize their
members (see Leyens, et al., 2001) is only part of the story. In other ways,
groups are, and have to be, open to new ideas, new directions, and even the
inclusion of outsiders. These qualities permit groups to survive, adapt, and
grow (see Caporael & Brewer, 2000; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Moscovici,
Mugny, & van Avermaet, 1985). The ideas presented in this chapter derive
from a program of research exploring the subjective group dynamics model
(Abrams, Marques, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison, & Bown (in press);
Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998). We propose that
social inclusion or exclusion of individuals within groups is substantially
affected by intergroup context and may not depend so much on the objective
magnitude or nature of their differences from others within their group. Thus,
social inclusion and exclusion are often phenomena that need to be understood
in terms of intergroup relations rather than interpersonal relationships or per-
sonal characteristics of individuals. This chapter describes some key aspects of
the model, and introduces several areas to which it can be applied.
We begin by considering the criteria that group members may use to judge
deviants. We propose that the intergroup context shapes the way group norms
are perceived and defended, and that the social identity approach to intergroup
relations provides a useful way of understanding the reasons for this. We pro-
pose that people use judgments and evaluations of individual group members
to sustain the prescriptive norms of their ingroup. We describe some of our
work on the “black sheep effect” and related patterns, which shows that differ-
ences in evaluations of normative and deviant members within groups co-occur
with intergroup differentiation. Intragroup differentiation increases when
intergroup relationships are more salient, are competitive, and attract higher
identification among their members. When people value ingroups over out-
groups as a whole they then favor other individuals from either group that
endorse the value of the ingroup. We describe some research demonstrating
that this more subtle form of ingroup bias follows a developmental sequence,
which implies the development of a “theory of group mind” during childhood.
The developmental changes provide a sociocognitive basis for the acceptance
or rejection of people based on their endorsement of ingroup norms.
Group members are particularly sensitive to the direction in which others
deviate, rating antinormative deviance as more atypical than pronormative
deviance. Evaluations are not based on extremity or the actual behavior of
deviant members, but on the extent to which the deviant helps to validate the
ingroup norm relative to other members of the same group. Moreover, the
presence of antinormative deviants may provoke efforts to validate the ingroup
norm by strengthening, rather than weakening, a positive ingroup stereotype.
Therefore, by isolating antinorm deviants from the ingroup, the norms of the
group are both clarified and strengthened. Similarly by isolating outgroup
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antinorm deviants (i.e., those who endorse ingroup norms) from the outgroup,
the distance between groups is sustained while the superiority of the ingroup is
supported. Finally, we consider whether, and under what conditions, certain
group members, specifically leaders, may be given license to deviate without
inviting exclusion from their group members.
DEVIANCE WITHIN GROUPS
For a group to exist, and to be entitative, there must be a perception of unity
at some level (see Campbell, 1958; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille (in press).
Sherman, Hamilton, and Lewis (1999) proposed that, “members of highly enti-
tative groups will perceive greater differentiation from outgroups and thus
show a greater degree of ingroup bias in perceptions and interpretations of
events . . . [In addition] . . . entitative ingroups should be seen as having more
power to do good things and to achieve positive goals . . . highly entitative
groups are more likely to develop clear group norms” (p. 102). It follows that
the presence of deviant group members might undermine group entitativity
and thus evoke strong reactions from other group members. Moreover, for
groups to define and achieve their goals they rely on compliance and co-
operation among their members. Dissent or diversity may potentially derail the
group’s plans and call into question the premises on which it acts. Challenges
to the group’s ethos may be met with strong criticism and even overt hostility.
For example, in the UK, a Labour member of parliament, George Galloway,
was excluded from membership of the Labour Party for depicting the war with
Iraq as unjust and illegal. A civil servant weapons inspector, David Kelly, was
apparently driven to commit suicide after having shared with journalists his
doubts about the government’s evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
We follow the classic ideas proposed by Festinger and others in holding
that people depend on social consensus to achieve a subjectively valid sense of
reality, particularly social reality. When groups show disunity there are coun-
terveiling pressures to sustain consensus (e.g., Asch, 1952; Boyanowsky &
Allen, 1973; Festinger, 1950; Hogg & Hains, 1998; Janis, 1982; Levine, 1989;
Sherif, 1936). Given that so much may be at stake, psychologically and some-
times materially, it is not surprising that group members tend to conform to
group norms and may pressurize other members of the group to do likewise
(see Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Davis & Witte, 1996; Schachter, 1951; Shaw,
1976). In an effort to maintain or support this social reality, deviant people may
then be socially excluded from the benefits afforded to nondeviant ingroup
members.
In general terms it is likely that members who deviate more extremely are
likely to attract more attention from the rest of the group (cf. Mullen, 1991).
However, not all dimensions are likely to be equally important to judgments of
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group members. For example, a business meeting to discuss the sales pitch for
a new product may include a set of people that is diverse in terms of language,
culture, nonverbal behavior and political attitudes. However, the group may
care little about these variations because none are relevant to the group’s goal,
which is to sell the product. Diversity within the group may have no bearing on
the value of the group’s goals—the belief that what the group is doing or stands
for is valid and worthwhile and reflects positively on its members.
What factors may influence relevance of deviance for the group? One
important factor is the intergroup context. The social identity approach (e.g.,
Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) holds that groups and intergroup
relationships affect perception and behavior through the process of social cate-
gorization. When social identity is salient, category-based features will be
attributed to all category members, thereby minimizing individual differences
within categories, and maximizing intercategory differences (e.g., Abrams &
Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also
Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Self-Categorization Theory (SCT)
strengthens this idea. SCT considers two aspects of the fit between individuals
and social categories, comparative and normative fit (Oakes, 1996; Oakes,
Turner, & Haslam, 1991). According to SCT, perceptions of group members are
determined by a metacontrast, which can be approximated mathematically as a
ratio of intragroup differences versus intergroup differences (Hogg & McGarty,
1990; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987). This contrast produces abstract prototypes that represent the
positions (e.g., on an attitude continuum) that best capture differences between
the ingroup and outgroup to the detriment of intracategorical differences.
How do people make sense of a situation in which categorization fits well,
but particular individuals differ markedly from their fellow group members?
One possibility is that deviants may be overlooked or disregarded under the
operation of the metacontrast principle, particularly when the categories are
highly salient. Another possibility is that deviants are simply reclassified (e.g., a
former ingroup member is now classified as an outgroup member).
Alternatively, the presence of the deviant may invoke reassessment of the way
all people are classified and may invoke a different dimension for categoriza-
tion, reflecting a revised intergroup context (see Abrams, 1996, 1999; Spears,
Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997; Turner & Oakes, 1997). These responses
would improve the fit between the social categorization in use and the charac-
teristics of the people being categorized (Oakes et al., 1991, 1994). This out-
come would be psychologically satisfying to the extent that it would clarify
intergroup boundaries (see Hogg, 1993). However, if the existing categoriza-
tions are highly meaningful, and deviants are not, or cannot be, disregarded or
recategorized, it might be inevitable that their presence would alter the clarity
of distinctions between the groups. A possible cognitive response could be to
assimilate the group prototype toward the position held by the deviant, a
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process that would likely depend on the extremity of deviance (e.g., Kunda &
Oleson, 1997). However, in many situations adapting the group norm to take
account of a specific group member may be difficult, undesirable, or unwar-
ranted. Thus, the problem for other group members is how to deal with the
deviant without imperiling the group’s norms.
SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS
The Subjective Group Dynamics model (SGD) Marques, Páez, & Abrams,
1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001) follows social identity theory’s
tenet that group members wish to ensure that ingroups have higher value than
relevant outgroups. It also adopts the presumption from SCT that the catego-
rization process is largely driven by a search for meaning and reduction of uncer-
tainty (e.g., Hogg, 2000). It follows that people are motivated to ensure the
validity of a subjective sense of reality that is defined and shared by the ingroup
(Abrams, 1990, 1992; Abrams & Hogg, 1988, 2001; Hogg, 2001a; Marques &
Páez, 1994). This certainty is strengthened to the extent that self and ingroup are
seen as sharing a common set of norms and values (e.g., Turner, 1991; see also
Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger & Clement, 1996). The SGD model
proposes that people generally strive to confirm ingroup reality. To achieve this,
group members should resist evidence that weakens the validity of ingroup
norms, and accept evidence that confirms those norms. In sum, group members
have two related motives; to maximize and sustain positive intergroup distinc-
tiveness whilst also maximizing and sustaining the relative validity of prescriptive
ingroup norms. The SGD model holds that these motives are satisfied through
parallel and complementary processes of intergroup differentiation and intra
group differentiation (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Taboada, 1998).
Ingroup superiority may often be achieved through category differentia-
tion, whereby the ingroup is favored globally over the outgroup (see Mullen,
Brown, & Smith, 1992). However, validation of ingroup norms often depends
on making distinctions within groups to determine which individual members
either reinforce or undermine those norms. The SGD model assumes that
judgments of individual group members remain essentially depersonalized,
that is, they are framed with reference to group norms and stereotypes. The
intergroup and intragroup processes operate in conjunction so that it becomes
possible, rather than paradoxical, that group members favor the ingroup over
the outgroup as a whole, while also preferring particular outgroup members
over particular ingroup members.
Bases for Differentiation—Descriptive and Prescriptive
To develop this idea, Marques, Abrams et al. (1998) distinguished between
denotative and prescriptive norms. Denotative norms provide the descriptive
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criteria for categorization and are thus relevant to the metacontrast principle,
based on comparative and normative fit, as defined in SCT. Denotative norms
are perceived as essential for, inherent in, or entirely indicative of category
membership. For example, physical appearance provides clear sets of attributes
associated with, and largely diagnostic of, race. Ingroup bias may result from a
category membership inference that is based on denotative characteristics alone.
In many instances, category membership is likely to be perceived as inextricably
linked to denotative norms, such that category ascriptions can be made imme-
diately from a person’s adherence to these norms. It seems likely that denotative
norms are often applied nonconsciously or at least relatively unreflectively.
However, people may devote conscious attention to denotative norms when
there is a high degree of initial ambiguity regarding category memberships (e.g.,
Abrams, 1990, 1996; Abrams & Brown, 1989; Abrams & Masser, 1998), when it
is important to ensure that no outgroup members are categorized as ingroup
members (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), when perceivers are
prejudiced (Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997), when they need to pre-
serve cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), or when they want to
avoid expressing prejudice (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Plant &
Devine, 1998). Norms that denote category membership may be strongly asso-
ciated with judgments, but they are not the sole basis for evaluation of ingroup
and outgroup members.
The SGD model holds that group members are vigilant about deviation
from norms that are prescriptive of values, attitudes, and behavior for their own
and other groups. Whereas denotative norms are indicative of group member-
ship, prescriptive norms relate to the validity of the group’s social standing. A
simple illustration of the denotative/prescriptive distinction may clarify this
point. Soccer teams sometimes have to wear different colored outfits, depend-
ing on the colors of the home team. The fans need to know how the colors indi-
cate the membership of the team, and ingroup bias is determined by the
category membership denoted by those colors rather than the colors them-
selves. In contrast, ingroup prescriptive norms are that fans should cheer when
their team performs well. Upholding consensus for prescriptive ingroup norms
provides a way of ensuring that the positive evaluation of the ingroup is
subjectively valid (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; McGarty,
1999).
Ingroup and outgroup norms differ in many situations (e.g., in the
Champion’s League, English people should support Manchester United,
Spanish people should support Real Madrid). However, there are also norms
and standards which are not oppositional, but which are still very important for
ingroup members (see Forsyth, 1990). For example, ingroups may desire to
embody generic societal, cultural or moral norms to a greater extent than
outgroups (e.g., to be law abiding, to work hard, to be loyal, to be attractive,
etc.). This line of reasoning is compatible with evidence that people are liable
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to project their ingroup attributes more than outgroup attributes onto superor-
dinate groups (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). It is also consistent with
research showing that the ingroup is usually accorded a more human essence
than outgroups (Leyens et al., 2001). Group members’ aspiration that the
ingroup has superior standing on these generically valued attributes requires
some validation—instances that confirm such perceptions. In sum, both oppo-
sitional and generic norms can take on a prescriptive character.
Inclusive and exclusive reactions to particular group members will depend
on whether they appear to be an ingroup or outgroup member and whether
their behavior undermines or validates the ingroup prescriptive norm.
Evaluations of group members may also depend on backward processing (see
Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001), a form of counterfactual thinking that
occurs when observed events run counter to expectations (Miller & Prentice,
1996). In these situations, people generate a specific frame of reference that
accounts for the counterintuitive event, and they construct, online, a standard
of comparison relevant to that particular context (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
Deviants violate normative expectancies, and this makes prescriptive norms
highly salient as standards against which to judge ingroup and outgroup behav-
ior. These judgments reflect the evaluative consequences of group members’
characteristics and behavior for the ingroup and hence for the social self.
Ingroup members attend to prescriptive norms so as to ensure consensus on
criteria for positive ingroup evaluation. The value of ingroup consensus is often
made all the more real when a member breaks ranks or deviates from the group
norms (e.g., Holtz & Miller, 1985; Miller, Gross, & Holtz, 1991). Salient varia-
tions from prescriptive norms are therefore very likely to induce active regula-
tion of the subjective image of the group. Specifically, because group members
are motivated to preserve the subjective validity of their group’s norms, they
will wish to correct or remove challenges to that norm within the group, and to
gather evidence from outside the group to bolster the ingroup norm.
A relatively untested aspect of the SGD model is based on Abrams (1990,
1994, 1996, 1999) Social Self-Regulation (SSR) model. This holds that specific
goals or standards for group members can be determined by several variables,
including the nature of the intergroup context (e.g., competitive vs. co-operative
intergroup relations), group members’ motivation to sustain a positive identity,
their skills and ability to enact certain behaviors, and anticipated responses
from a potential audience. Nonadherence to a group goal may occur either
because of failure to regulate action or because of disruption. In either case, if
group membership remains important, members are likely to engage in cor-
rective action that diverges from routine forms of intergroup differentiation
and intragroup conformity (e.g., diverges from a simple rule of favoring ingroup
members over outgroup members).
There is a variety of direct and indirect evidence that self-regulation
processes can be engaged to influence intergroup and intragroup behavior
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(e.g., Abrams, 1985; Abrams & Brown, 1989; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998;
Monteith, et al., 1998; Plant & Devine, 1998; see also Reicher, Spears, &
Postmes, 1995; Spears, 2001). We believe that social self-regulation processes
underpin reactions to ingroup and outgroup deviance because maintenance of
ingroup standards is a means of validating the standards that are used to regu-
late the self. Therefore, when social identity is salient or important, one aspect
of group members’ self-regulation is the regulation of the group’s adherence to
group standards. The presence of a deviant group member indicates that a
group is failing to sustain its norms and values. This is likely to require group
members to stop and think, to select actions consciously and strategically, so as
to sustain the ingroup norm. Specifically, evaluations of such deviants should
depend on whether the deviant’s behavior provides a source of validation for
ingroup norms, either directly or by undermining outgroup norms in relative
terms.
Evidence: Responses to Ingroup and Outgroup Deviance
People tend to evaluatively upgrade attractive ingroup members and down-
grade unattractive ingroup members, as compared to analogous outgroup
members (for a review, see Marques & Páez, 1994). This phenomenon has
been labeled the “black sheep effect” (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). The
black sheep effect occurs even when individuals show a strong overall prefer-
ence for the ingroup (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992), and the effect is larger
when individuals identify with the ingroup (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999;
Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Hutchison, Abrams, & Viki,
2002). It arises either when perceivers judge members singly (Marques et al.,
1988), or when they directly compare normative and deviant members from
the same group, or two members from different groups (Marques & Yzerbyt,
1988). The black sheep effect emerges when differences between group mem-
bers are relevant to the maintenance of positive ingroup valence or to inter-
group distinctiveness. The effect represents one manifestation of the operation
of subjective group dynamics. Similar patterns of evaluation occur when group
members deviate in terms of their attitudes rather than their attractiveness or
likeability (for reviews, see Abrams et al., in press; Marques, Abrams et al.,
2001; Marques & Páez, 1994). Moreover, the effects are magnified when the
ingroup’s status is threatened or insecure (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001;
see also Christian, Hutchison, & Abrams, 2003).
Negative evaluations of deviant group members should not be taken to
imply that the group members would always want to evict the deviant from the
group. Different methods may be used to sustain ingroup norms. For example,
Marques et al. (2001, Experiment 1) found that when the ingroup norm was
undermined, participants reported higher willingness to persuade deviant tar-
gets to change their opinion in a forthcoming discussion. In Experiment 2, the
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black sheep effect emerged most clearly when the ingroup lacked normative
uniformity. Once again participants were most willing to influence deviant indi-
viduals to change their opinion when the ingroup norm was potentially under-
mined by low ingroup uniformity. The Marques et al. (2001) studies illustrate
that norm-reinforcing responses may not only take the form of derogatory judg-
ments but also willingness to reintegrate deviants. Norm reinforcement
emerges more strongly when the validity of a relevant ingroup norm is endan-
gered by lack of perceived ingroup consensus. In addition, the studies showed
that norm-reinforcing responses emerge primarily where deviants are deemed
to be ingroup members, rather than in interpersonal or in outgroup settings.
The Relationship Between Intergroup and Intragroup
Differentiation and Social Identity According to the SGD model,
phenomena such as the black sheep effect result from people’s desire to sustain
valued differences between groups. Therefore, differentiation between cate-
gories as a whole should be accompanied, and validated by prescriptive norm
differentiation among members within groups. In a series of studies, Marques,
Abrams, et al. (1998) showed that differentiation between and within groups
may both arise in the same situation. A minimal (bogus) criterion was used to
assign participants to different social categories (e.g., “X” and “Y”). They were
informed of the norms associated with each category and were asked to evalu-
ate the groups as a whole, and four “normative” members and one deviant
member from either the ingroup or the outgroup. Participants judged the
ingroup as a whole more favorably than the outgroup (denotative norm differ-
entiation), and they also upgraded members whose responses were closer to
the ingroup norm and derogated members whose responses were opposed to
this norm, irrespective of whether these were ingroup or outgroup members
(prescriptive norm differentiation). In subsequent experiments we found this
pattern was more extreme when the prescriptive norm was made more salient,
and when participants felt accountable to ingroup rather than outgroup
members. Finally, we found that evaluations of group members was related to
participants’ identification with the ingroup. Those who initially identified
more strongly with the ingroup favored individuals from either group who pro-
vided relatively greater support for the ingroup norm. In turn, those who
engaged in more prescriptive norm differentiation subsequently showed
greater increases in identification. Taken together, this evidence is consistent
with the idea that people selectively evaluate members within groups in a way
that sustains their ingroup norm and their social identity.
The Development of Subjective Group Dynamics—A Theory of
Group Mind? Previously, we have argued that the motivation to favor the
ingroup over the outgroup also motivates the upgrading of normative relative
to deviant ingroup members. However, the latter phenomenon seems likely to
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require a more sophisticated understanding of intergroup relationships. Before
people can make distinctions among group members they need to understand
the relevant criteria for judgment. In turn, this involves an appreciation of the
consensual value of prescriptive norms that uphold the ingroup’s validity.
Intragroup differentiation involves distinguishing among group members in
terms of their adherence to group-related attributes. It is not simply a matter
of treating each group member as an individual.
One way to investigate the idea that subjective group dynamics are a
sophisticated aspect of intergroup bias is to examine intergroup and intragroup
judgments made by children of different ages. Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, and
Marques (2003) conducted a study in the context of a summer play scheme for
children. Children attending these schemes were drawn from a range of dif-
ferent schools, and thus were effectively in a new ad-hoc group, much like the
children in the summer camp studies conducted by Sherif (e.g., Sherif &
Sherif, 1953). We used the fact that a number of different schemes operated in
the region to present children aged 6–7 years or 10–11 years with statements
that were ostensibly made by ingroup members or by outgroup members. The
children were first asked to evaluate the ingroup and outgroup as a whole.
Children of all ages expressed significant levels of global bias in favor of their
own play scheme. Next, children were presented with the statements. Two
group members made normative statements, which simply involved praising
the play scheme that they attended. A third group member was a deviant who
praised their own play scheme but also praised the other play scheme.
Manipulation checks established that children of all ages did perceive the
normative targets to be typical and the deviant to be less typical of the group.
Younger children favored ingroup targets over outgroup, but did not differen-
tiate significantly between normative and deviant targets. In contrast, older
children favored the normative ingroup target over the deviant ingroup target,
and favored the deviant outgroup target over the normative outgroup target.
Thus, only the older children displayed the pattern we expect when subjective
group dynamics are operating. Of equal importance was that evaluative differ-
entiation among the targets was significantly related to ingroup bias.
A further test of the development of subjective group dynamics was
conducted by Abrams, Rutland and Cameron (2003). In that study, nearly 500
children aged between 5 and 12 years were presented with statements made by
supporters of their own (England) or an outgroup (Germany) soccer team dur-
ing the World Cup Soccer championships in 2002. As in the play scheme study,
children of all ages showed significant global intergroup bias, but intragroup
differentiation increased significantly with age, as did the relationship between
intragroup bias and intergroup bias. Moreover, in the soccer study we meas-
ured group identification. It emerged that identification became more strongly
related to intragroup differentiation with age. Finally, both of these studies
revealed a further link in the chain between intergroup and intragroup
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processes. The extent to which children favored ingroup normative members
over deviant members, and the reverse pattern for outgroup members, was
associated with the extent to which they recognized how acceptable each target
would be to other ingroup and outgroup members (measured on an index we
called differential inclusion). As shown in Figure 8.1, we found that differential
inclusion mediated the effects of age on differential evaluation of the group
members. In summary, the development of subjective group dynamics appears
to be contingent on a developing understanding of how group dynamics oper-
ate in an intergroup context. We conjecture that this development is akin to the
emergence of a “theory of mind” (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987; Perner,
Ruffman & Leekam, 1994) but at the group level—a “theory of group mind.”
We are currently investigating whether this is associated with cognitive and
social perspective taking abilities, and whether it is limited to particular types
of group membership.
These two developmental studies challenge conventional ideas that older
children’s increasing cognitive sophistication leads them away from strong or
blatant intergroup biases (see Aboud, 1988). Instead, we find that older children
become more discerning about who, within both the ingroup and the outgroup,
should be evaluated highly. Rather than showing a simple blanket prejudice in
favor of the ingroup, they endorse individuals whose attitudes provide relative
validation of the ingroup’s positive status or position. Second, these studies sug-
gest that whereas global intergroup bias may be a relatively basic response to
salient social categorization, the linkage of intergroup bias to intragroup bias is
a more subtle, and perhaps more powerful, aspect of the way group members
sustain their own group’s advantages. By reserving criticism for deviant ingroup








FIGURE 8.1 Development of subjective group dynamics in children
Note: All arrows depict significant relationships between variables in results from studies involving
children aged 6–7 and 10–11 (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003) and aged 5–12
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members, and allowing praise for deviant outgroup members who implicitly or
explicitly acknowledge the ingroup’s value, it is possible to avoid censure for
being biased against members of the outgroup, while bolstering the ingroup’s
position. Thus the social control of group members may operate through the
potential sanctions that are in place if they undermine prescriptive ingroup
norms. The targets of these sanctions are likely to vary depending on the rela-
tive vulnerability of ingroup norms at particular times. Thus, although individual
children may be victimized or rejected by others, it may well be that the locus
of these forms of rejection is the norm, not the person. As a result, resolutions
to problems such as bullying and victimization in school may reside at least as
much in understanding the intergroup context and group norms as in the par-
ticular behavior of specific individual victims or perpetrators.
Deviant Derogation as Stereotype Maintenance The research
presented so far shows that reactions to deviant ingroup members serve as an
identity maintenance function. Those members whose behavior or characteristics
present the greatest threat to the integrity or value of the ingroup consistently
attract the most negative and extreme evaluations (see also Yzerbyt, Castano,
Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), and invite efforts to change their position.
Hutchison and Abrams (2003) suggested that the reactions to undesirable
ingroup members might function in other ways to protect the ingroup stereo-
type (see also Marques & Páez, 1994). Hutchison and Abrams (2003) examined
the impact of a clearly undesirable ingroup member on participants’ percep-
tions of their groups. Psychology students who differed in their level of ingroup
identification rated “psychologists” on a series of pretested positive and negative
stereotypical characteristics before and after reading information about a desir-
able (e.g., competent, ethical) or undesirable (e.g., incompetent, unethical)
psychologist. In line with previous findings, high identifiers were more positive
than low identifiers in their evaluation of a desirable ingroup member but were
more negative than low identifiers in their evaluation of an undesirable ingroup
member (see also Branscombe et al., 1993). Moreover, high identifiers
expressed a more positive ingroup stereotype after, compared to before, read-
ing about an undesirable ingroup member. They also expressed a more positive
ingroup stereotype than high identifiers who read about a desirable ingroup
member. In contrast, low identifiers’ stereotypes were relatively unaffected by
the target manipulation. This pattern of intragroup evaluations is consistent
with Marques and Páez’s (1994) suggestion that in derogating undesirable
ingroup members, people would attempt to protect the ingroup stereotype by
separating the good representatives from the “black sheep”. Further support for
this conjecture is provided by recent research showing that, relative to low
identifiers, high identifiers tend to perceive undesirable exemplars as less
typical of the ingroup (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002a), are more
concerned with erroneously including outgroup members in the ingroup
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(Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002b), and will expend more cog-
nitive resources to psychologically exclude undesirable members from the
ingroup (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, & Leemans, 2001).
A second study (Hutchison, 2003) examined effects of identification with
the ingroup on university students’ reactions to a positive or negative ingroup
member. Participants first read a series of statements supposedly made by a tar-
get student who expressed either a positive (i.e., friendly, welcoming) or nega-
tive (i.e., unfriendly, hostile) attitude toward other students at the same
university. They evaluated the target and rated the impact of the target on the
image of the group. They then rated the group on a series of positive and neg-
ative stereotypical attributes. Relative to low identifiers, high identifiers were
more positive in their evaluation of a desirable ingroup member, but were more
negative in their evaluation of an undesirable ingroup member. Moreover, rel-
ative to low identifiers, high identifiers believed that the image conveyed by the
desirable target was more positive for the image of the ingroup, but that the
image conveyed by the undesirable target was more negative for the image of
the ingroup. A control condition was included to examine the stereotype of the
group when no target information was provided. Low identifiers’ stereotypes
were relatively unaffected by the target manipulation. However, higher identi-
fiers who read about a negative group member estimated that fewer students
had negative stereotypical characteristics and more had positive characteristics
than those who read about a positive group member, as shown in Figure 8.2.
These findings show that the presence of deviant ingroup members
provokes reactions with contrasting valence at the intragroup and intergroup
levels. Among people who identify highly with the group, an individual deviant
ingroup member is more strongly derogated and is perceived to convey a neg-
ative image of the group, while at the same time the positive stereotype of the
group becomes reinforced or bolstered. Thus, it seems that deviants serve as
exemplars from which the group norm can be contrasted, consistent with the
idea of backward processing, described above.
Pro-Norm and Anti-Norm Deviance Much of the research described
above concerned judgments of ingroup and outgroup deviants who were dif-
ferent from the norms of both groups. However, it did not address the specific
questions of whether evaluative differentiation between normative and deviant
members reflects either the magnitude and/or the particular direction, of
deviance. In common with social identity and self-categorization theories, the
SGD model assumes that groups have normative direction. It may be difficult
for group members to know the precise normative position for their group, but
they may be relatively sure about the directions in which their group’s norms
differ from those of relevant other groups. It follows that deviation may be
judged in terms of its perceived departure from the group’s normative direction
rather than objective or absolute differences from the norm.
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In an intergroup context, members who deviate towards the opposing
group (who we label “anti-norm” deviants) should be perceived as more atypical
than those who deviate away from the opposing group (who we label “pro-norm”
deviants, see Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000), because anti-norm
deviants pose a greater contrast with the normative direction of the group.
Anti-norm deviants may sometimes be members who adopt positions that are
broadly moderate, and pro-norm deviants may sometimes be extremists or
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FIGURE 8.2 Negative and positive stereotyping of the ingroup following exposure to
a desirable, undesirable or no ingroup target
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fanatics when judged in a wider context (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, McGarty,
Turner, & Onorato, 1995). However, this will not always be true, and must
depend upon the wider context. For example, members of the UK Labour
Party who strongly support joining the Euro currency (a pro-norm position in
line with the direction of Labour Party policy) would clearly not be judged as
extremists by members of countries that have already joined. According to the
SGD model, deviance that potentially undermines ingroup norms is highly
likely to attract hostile reactions. Conversely, if objective deviance potentially
validates ingroup norms, it is likely to attract positive evaluations. For this
reason group members may be tolerant, or even approving, of deviants whose
differences from other group members mean they can contribute positively to
the subjective validity of the group norm. To investigate this possibility we
extended our research paradigm to distinguish the two types of deviance. The
normative direction taken by anti-norm deviance undermines or rejects the
group’s position, and may imply relative validation of the norms of opposing
groups. The direction taken by pro-norm deviance, in contrast, validates and
supports the group’s aims or ethos and may enhance its distinctiveness relative
to opposing outgroups (Abrams et al., 2000). Two studies examined reactions to
anti- and pro-norm deviants and normative members when intergroup context
was implicit. A further two studies examined reactions when the intergroup
context was made more explicit.
Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 1) asked teenage participants to evaluate
people from their own gender group who were ostensibly being considered for
promotion in an organization. Candidates were depicted as all being very sim-
ilar in levels of competence, intelligence, politeness, and other features. One
candidate was much more feminine, and another was much more masculine
than the remaining (normative) candidates. The magnitude of deviation from
the norm was objectively equivalent for both the highly feminine and the highly
masculine candidate, and these differences were subsequently reported accu-
rately by participants. Participants regarded themselves as significantly more
similar to the normative candidates than to either of the deviant candidates.
However, despite the objective equivalence in the magnitude of deviance by
the anti- and pro-norm candidates, participants rated the pro-norm target as
having more in common with the group. The normative candidates were rated
as more attractive than the pro-norm and anti-norm candidates, but the pro-
norm candidate was also rated as more attractive than the anti-norm candidate.
Thus, although pro-norm deviants were disliked, they were tolerated more than
anti-norm deviants, consistent with the idea that ingroup pro-norm deviants
were less undermining of ingroup norms.
A further study (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 2002, Experiment 1),
examined reactions to deviance in a commercial banking organization.
Employees in a major UK offshore bank read descriptions of behavior by other
ingroup workers. All participants read about a normative worker. Half the
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participants also read about an anti-norm deviant who was critical of the organ-
ization, refused to do overtime work, and so forth. The other participants read
about a pro-norm deviant who was obsessed with supporting the organization,
and chose to work additional hours, recruit new members, and so forth. As in
Abrams et al.’s (2000) Experiment 1, evaluations of the anti-norm deviant were
significantly more negative than those of the pro-norm deviant, even though
they were both perceived as being equally different from the ingroup norm.
Moreover, more negative evaluations of deviants were significantly associated
with prior identification with the organization. Taken together, Abrams et al.
(2000, Experiment 1) and Abrams et al. (2002, Experiment 1) suggest that
when distinguishing among ingroup members, people are equally able to detect
the magnitude of pro-norm and anti-norm deviance, but they reserve their
most negative evaluative reactions for anti-norm deviants.
Turning to an explicitly intergroup context, Abrams et al. (2000,
Experiment 2) focused on British psychology students’ attitudes about the
number of asylum seekers that should be allowed entry to Britain each year.
Participants read the results of national surveys that ostensibly had been con-
ducted among psychology students or customs and immigration officers. They
were informed (accurately) that psychology students wanted no change in the
percentage of asylum seekers allowed to remain in Britain, but that immigra-
tion officers advocated a reduction in the numbers granted asylum by 30%.
Participants then viewed responses to several of the survey items by six respon-
dents, ostensibly either from a Psychology Survey or from a Customs Officers
Survey. Four target group members were normative in their opinions, one was
pronormative and the other was antinormative. Across conditions and types of
deviant the mathematical difference between normative and deviant targets
was kept constant. Moreover, the anti-norm target in the ingroup and outgroup
conditions actually expressed an identical attitude (i.e., that there should be a
15% reduction in the numbers of asylum seekers allowed to remain in Britain).
As in our previous studies, participants were accurate when asked to report
the actual opinion position espoused by each target member. However, unlike
the results from the implicit intergroup context studies, pro-norm deviants
were judged to be equally typical of their group as the four normative
members. Only the anti-norm members were viewed as being atypical. This
suggests that judgments of typicality were made with reference to how much
the target helps to validate prescriptive norms, and not with reference to
statistical typicality. In the intergroup context of the study it seems reasonable
to suppose that typicality judgments reflected prototypicality as defined by the
metacontrast ratio in SCT (e.g., Haslam, et al., 1995). In line with the typicality
ratings, evaluations of ingroup normative members and ingroup pro-norm
deviants were more positive than evaluations of ingroup anti-norm deviants.
The reverse pattern was obtained for outgroup targets (see Figure 8.3). Indeed,
the outgroup anti-norm deviant was evaluated more positively than the ingroup
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anti-norm deviant, even though both targets expressed identical attitudes.
Finally, the more that participants identified with the ingroup the more
strongly they favored deviants that validated, as compared with deviants that
undermined, the ingroup norm, regardless of whether the deviants were mem-
bers of the ingroup or the outgroup.
Abrams et al. (2002, Experiment 2) conducted an analogous study in the
context of the University of Kent’s policy for admission of students from outside
Europe (“Overseas Students”). British universities charge a higher level of
tuition fees to students from outside Europe, but accordingly they try to
provide some advantages for these students, including privileged access to
accommodation on campus and related schemes. Pilot studies confirmed that
both groups of students did not object to the status quo. However, the norma-
tive direction among overseas students was that further privileges would be
justified. The normative direction among British students was that a reduction
in privileges for Overseas students would be appropriate. Participants were
then presented with statements, ostensibly taken from the pilot study, made by
three targets from each group about University policy for future cohorts of
Overseas students. From each group one target expressed the normative opin-
ion for the group, one expressed an anti-norm position and the other expressed
a pro-norm position. In fact, the anti-norm ingroup target and a pro-norm out-
group target expressed identical attitudes (more privileges for future members
of the outgroup), that were equally divergent from the current norm (maintain
the status quo). Conversely, the pro-norm ingroup and the anti-norm outgroup


















FIGURE 8.3 Favorability to pro-norm, normative, and anti-norm group members as
a function of group membership
Source: Abrams, Marques et al. (2000, Experiment 2).
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targets also expressed identical attitudes (fewer privileges for future members
of the outgroup).
Consistent with Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 2) anti-norm deviants
were rated as significantly more atypical than normative members and pro-
norm members. Typicality ratings of normative and pro-norm members did not
differ. Thus, despite potentially strong demand characteristics to distinguish
among all six targets on a single continuum, perceived typicality followed a
principle of relative normativeness, or prototypicality, independent of the
actual attitude position expressed and independent of objective similarities
among targets. This is consistent with the idea that typicality judgments are
attributable to prototypicality defined in the intergroup context, and not to
absolute differences among targets or to whether the positions adopted by the
target are ingroup validating per se.
The pattern of evaluations was also consistent with that found by Abrams
et al.’s (2000) Experiment 2. The pro-norm ingroup deviant was evaluated more
positively than the normative member, and both were evaluated more positively
than the anti-norm deviant. The reverse pattern was obtained for outgroup tar-
gets; evaluations of the pro-norm ingroup and anti-norm outgroup deviant were
equally positive. Moreover, differential evaluations of the pro- and anti-norm
deviants were strongly associated with the extent to which participants rated
the two types of deviants as differing in typicality.
Across the Abrams et al. (2000, 2002) studies the evidence converges to
show that as group membership becomes more salient (i.e., as the context
becomes more explicitly intergroup), people may engage in more intragroup
differentiation in terms of prescriptive norms. Anti-norm deviants are judged
to be more atypical of their group than equally divergent pro-norm deviants.
For ingroup targets, anti-norm deviants are evaluated very negatively, but pro-
norm deviants are often evaluated similarly to normative members (in an intra-
group setting) or even more favorably than normative members (in an
intergroup setting). Evaluations of particular group members reflect the extent
to which they help to validate rather than undermine the normative direction
of the group, and hence sustain social identity. In line with this, differential
evaluations in favor of ingroup validating targets within the ingroup and the
outgroup are associated with higher group identification. An interesting ques-
tion concerns the conditions under which ingroup anti-norm deviants are likely
to be ousted by group members, or indeed whether outgroup deviants might
be invited to join the ingroup.
Deviant Leadership A further direction of our research has been to
examine the moderating effects of the intragroup context on evaluations of
group members. We have used the leadership role as one variant of the intra-
group context and we have examined how deviant group members are evalu-
ated when members hold a leadership position compared to when they do not.
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This work also draws upon social identity research on leadership and normative
prototypicality (e.g., Haslam, 2001; Hogg, 2001b). Although it is arguable that
leaders cannot be socially excluded, it is still a possibility. For exmple, the
recent changes in Iraq clearly indicate that a person who is a leader in one inter-
group context (e.g., Saddam Hussein during the war), can be viewed as a
deviant and be socially excluded in another context (e.g., Saddam Hussein after
the war). Thus, the focus on group leaders further emphasises our argument
that social exclusion or inclusion is not just based on the characteristics of the
individual but rather on the inter-group context in which these characteristics
are manifested.
Hogg (2001b) argues that the most prototypical group member will gener-
ally emerge as group leader. For example, Hogg, Hains, and Mason (1998)
found that participants selected leaders who they perceived to be significantly
more prototypical than other group members. It also seems that the link
between normative prototypicality and leadership emergence is enhanced
when prototypes are internalized to the self-concept (social identity). For
example, Hains, Hogg, and Duck (1997) found that participants who identified
highly with their ingroup rated a (randomly assigned) leader as more effective
when they had been previously informed that the leader was prototypical of
their ingroup. Overall, we interpret Hogg’s (2001b) social identity theory of
leadership as holding that leadership accrues from prototypicality. Thus, the
prototypical member is both the most included (psychologically) and the one
who is most desired as leader.
Other research suggests an alternative (or additional) process may be oper-
ating with group leaders, whereby leadership confers prototypicality. For
example, Fielding and Hogg (1997) found that the longer a group member held
the leadership position the more prototypical they were perceived to be. It
seems reasonable to suppose that the presence of a leader may increase the
sense that the group has purpose, direction, and perhaps entitativity. Not only
are leaders likely to be perceived as more prototypical than other members, it
is also possible that they establish a focal point that makes the group prototype
concrete, and this may support the subjective reality of the group. For exam-
ple, Randsley de Moura and Abrams (2001a) found that the presence of a nor-
mative leader increased the perceived entitativity of the group.
Leaders may also be given scope to deviate from group norms and to rede-
fine the goals or values of their group (see Hollander, 1958). Haslam and his
colleagues examined reactions to non-prototypical group leaders (e.g.,
Haslam & Platow, 2001; Haslam et al., 2001). For example, Haslam et al. (2001)
suggested that perceived leader charisma may depend on whether a leader
affirms ingroup identity. They conducted a study examining whether the leader
role may attract increased perceived charisma if the organization’s outcomes
show a positive turnaround rather than a decline. They found that the leader was
perceived as more charismatic when their prior behavior had been even-handed
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or identity affirming, rather than identity negating. Furthermore, even-handed
leaders were perceived as more charismatic following a positive turnaround,
and identity-affirming behavior protected leaders from negative reactions
following a decline.
In Haslam and Platow’s (2001) study participants viewed a video recording
of an ingroup student leader discussing a decision to nominate union board
members for a prize. The leadership manipulation was devised so that in the dis-
cussion the leader either appeared to be “identity-affirming” (ingroup favoring),
“even-handed”, or “identity negating” (outgroup favoring) in their nominations.
While the leader was judged to be the fairest in the even-handed condition, the
support of the leader was greatest when they were ingroup favoring.
Platow and van Knippenberg (2001) varied the prototypicality and behav-
ior of ingroup leaders and found similar results regarding non-prototypical
leaders. To manipulate leader prototypicality, participants viewed information
demonstrating two overlapping distributions for the ingroup and the outgroup.
They were then informed about a leader who was in the centre of the ingroup’s
distribution (“normative”), or a leader in the tail away from the outgroup’s
distribution (“outlier”), or in the tail towards the outgroup norm (“outgroup
bordering”). To manipulate leader behavior, participants were informed about
the leader’s allocation of a mix of enjoyable and boring tasks to an anonymous
ingroup member and to an anonymous outgroup member. Based on SCT it was
predicted that non-prototypical leaders would need to demonstrate ingroup
favoring behavior to secure endorsement. Results confirmed that endorsement
for the outgroup bordering (anti-norm deviant) leader was high when that
leader demonstrated ingroup favoritism but significantly lower when the leader
demonstrated outgroup favoritism.
The research into leadership and prototypicality suggests that non-
prototypical group leaders are particularly interesting because of the conflict
they create between their group norm and their own opinion/preference.
These leaders often face difficult decisions and are likely to be vulnerable to
criticism from other group members. Based on the SGD model, several inter-
esting research questions arise from the research outlined above. For example,
we wondered whether the pattern of evaluations and reactions to non-
prototypical leaders has anything to do with leadership at all. In the studies
outlined above (Haslam et al., 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001), the
targets were already labeled as leaders. No comparable non-leaders were
presented. Moreover, all targets were ingroup members. Therefore, it is not
possible to determine whether the effects of prototypicality were unique to the
leadership role and/or unique to ingroup judgments. Using the SGD model as
a theoretical framework, we directly tested the question of whether non-
prototypical group leaders are evaluated differently from non-prototypical
group members who are not group leaders.
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Randsley de Moura and Abrams (2001b) used the asylum attitudes para-
digm from Abrams et al. (2000), in which participants viewed pro-norm,
normative and anti-norm targets from either the ingroup or the outgroup.
Participants were either told that the anti-norm target was the leader of the
group, or participants were told that there was a leader but not which member
it was. When an ingroup anti-norm deviant was specified as the leader, we
found greater intragroup differentiation between targets than when no leader
was specified. Specifically, as shown in Figure 8.4, the ingroup anti-norm tar-
get was downgraded and the ingroup pro-norm target was upgraded relative to
the control condition. This evidence suggests that current leaders who under-
mine group norms are likely to attract strongly negative reactions from group
members, as compared with reactions to similarly deviant nonleaders. That is,
having broken ranks with the group, leaders may be just as vulnerable to rejec-
tion as other deviant members.
We were also interested in whether prospective anti-norm leaders might be
afforded greater leeway to define the group norm in relation to future activi-
ties, perhaps because they are judged to be more prototypical than similarly
anti-norm nonleaders. Accordingly, Randsley de Moura and Abrams (2002a)
used the asylum paradigm again, and manipulated leadership by telling partic-
ipants either that the anti-norm target had been selected to be a future leader
or merely that one of the targets would be a leader, without specifying which

































FIGURE 8.4 Favorability Ratings of Ingroup Targets as a Function of Leadership
Source: Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2001b.
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one. We found that future leadership in the hands of an anti-norm target
reduced the participants’ ratings of typicality for pro-norm targets. We also
found that anti-norm targets were perceived more favorably when they were
specified as leaders compared to when they were not. This seems consistent
with the conferral hypothesis, suggesting that being a future leader may offset
potential criticism of anti-norm targets (Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002a;
2002b; 2003). This raises interesting questions about the capacity of leaders to
shape and shift group norms rather than being at the mercy of social control
processes typically associated with subjective group dynamics. For example, the
recent history of successive leadership battles in the Conservative Party in
Britain suggests that leaders are often elected with a mandate to set a “new”
agenda or manifesto, but tolerance for new leaders may not be sustained if they
fail to reflect the norms of the group (e.g., strong Euro-scepticism, traditional
values). In such a situation, the leaders may be ejected from their positions of
power and excluded from the leadership group while they languish on the back-
benches of parliament.
CONCLUSIONS
The SGD model holds important implications for the management of deviance
and diversity within society. People who are rejected by groups are not neces-
sarily their most deviant members in objective terms. Quite extreme forms of
(pro-norm) deviance may be tolerated by groups, and may be regarded as rel-
atively normal. This may hold the key to phenomena such as group extremity
shifts, groupthink, and polarization (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, &
Turner, 1990; Janis, 1982; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989), whereby a group’s
norms may become increasingly extreme under the influence of pro-norm
deviants. As groups become more extreme, their “moderate” (i.e., anti-norm)
members may lose the ear of the group, be vilified and either conform or be
rejected. Thus, for all kinds of group decisions it may be that voices of reason—
those who countenance the views of outgroups, for example, may be disre-
garded, coerced into conformity, and seen as vindicating the group’s norm.
These phenomena suggest that policy makers who are concerned with issues of
social exclusion should consider the situation in not just terms of the “victim”
and the excluders, but also the intergroup context. A consideration of subjec-
tive group dynamics processes could be useful in contexts such as school,
organizations with multiple teams, the management of sports fans, and those
working to establish communities that include diverse groups. Under some
circumstances, despite apparently tolerant attitudes towards particular
outgroup individuals, forcing groups together may result in a hardening of
intergroup norm differences, and a resistance to change rather than integration
and tolerance.
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